CO129-451 - Public Offices - 1918 — Page 255

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.] 251

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There is an aspect of the situation on which I venture to touch with much diffidence. All this tangle of schemes, concessions, and loans is accentuating the acute local estrangement which exists between Japan and the United States, and if the views of the American Minister reflect those of his Government, there is a growing disposition to challenge Japan's action in China. In offering to furnish China with a loan of 625,000,000 gold for military purposes in Europe, in undertaking to equip a Chinese army of 48,000 men for service in France, in intimating their intention to take part in aud determine such a measure of currency reform as China may be held to require, and in various other ways the United States Government have given evidence of their intention to substitute for a policy of detachment in the past one of active interest in Chinese questions in the future.

(Copies to Tokyo and Washington.)

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[2560]

a

C

O

January 4.

7053

SECTION 2.

Rec

REG 8 FEB 18

No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Mr. Balfour-(Received January 4, 1918.)

sense of

(No. 371. Confidential.) Sir,

Pelting, November 13, 1917. THE exchange of notes between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii hae excited but languid interest in China. The inspired telegram which the Kokusai Agency bad sent about the Ishii Mission and its doings in Washington had prepared Chinese public opinion for the assertion of something like a Monroe doctrine over China, and there was feeling of perceptible relief in learning that the mountain had brought forth so little after such prolonged labour. The Chinese have grown accustomed through long usage to the phraseology of diplomatic documents of this kind, and are not inclined to attach much importance to assurances about the independence or territorial integrity of their country. They know very well that a nation which can safeguard its own territory stands in no need of such assurances, and they point to Korea as an illustration of the practical value of these disinterested professions. They feel, however, a disappointment that America, who has hitherto pursued an independent policy in China, should have thought it necessary to join with Japan in proclaiming her desires and intentions on the subject. But the document itself they admit is comparatively harmless and rather meaningless. The expression "special interest has already occurred in at least three agreements between Japan and Great Britain, and when the United States makes a public announcement once more" of the recognition of such interests, the reiteration of an established fact produces but little impression, especially when it is virtually neutralised by the other provisions of the document.

The present Government of China can hardly be said to represent what little public opinion exists in the country, and, so far as it is concerned, it is daily, unless rumour is entirely at fault, engaged in bartering away privileges to Japan of far greater practical importance than any academic recognition of special interests implies. But to make sure of solicitude for their reputation, the Government, in their reply to the Japanese Minister, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose, made a point of stating that they recognised the special relations created by territorial propinquity in so far only as they were provided for in existing treaties, and that they did not consider agreements entered into by other nations as binding on them.

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Neither my Japanese nor my American colleague seemed to view the exchange of notes with much enthusiasm. Baron Hayashi contented himself with saying that they were little more than a repetition of well-worn formulas, while the American Minister was evidently concerned at the unfavourable impression which this departure in American diplomacy would probably make upon Chinese public opinion. He read me an explanatory statement which he had been instructed to make to the Chinese Govern- ment when communicating the text of the notes, and he has since taken care to have it published in the local press. From the enclosed copy of the statement, it will be seen that the American version of the genesis of the notes is not altogether favourable to Japan. The visit of Viscount Ishii is represented as having afforded an opportunity for friendly discussion of the interosts of America and Japan in the Orient by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan as regarda China is not one of aggression, and that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or indirectly of the special relations to China created by geographical position. This is interpreted by the Chinese as iudicating that the arrangement is meant to check the aggressive tendencies of Japan, and to minimise, if not neutralise, the advantages accruing from the enjoyment of special relations." The relations are in turn explained away by the truism that Japan, in virtue of her geographical position, must necessarily have a certain advantage over other countries not similarly situated in commercial and industrial enterprises in China.

The American covering communication, however, it is pointed out, goes farther than this, and expressly emphasises the fact that the exchanged notes introduce a policy of non-interference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. In fact, it

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